The Creation of a Rapid Reaction Force by an Avantguard Group of Countries: a Proposal (2/3)

Thanks to the single currency the EU became a global actor on the monetary plane and now the Reform Treaty has created the conditions for the EU to make significant steps forward even in the sphere of security policy. The proposal here presented refers to the institutional innovations contained in the RT in which a qualified majority is scheduled for, and it presumes that they will form a legal base sufficient to allow an avant-guard group of countries of the Union to have a Rapid Reaction Force at the service of the European Council and, as set up in the RT, of the United Nations.

Costs

The implementation cost of the RRF is an issue for which only figures of gross estimate can be supplied. In order to provide for an evaluation, official sources relating to the extent of the force to be set up are taken into consideration as well as the estimate of the costs for troops, comparable to the American ones, for efficiency and effectiveness. T

he aim of the Helsinki European Council is the establishment of a force of 60,000 men capable of being deployed within two months and of remaining in the theatre of operations for about a year. As is well known, an equal number of men must be kept as reserves and the same amount must be in training, reaching thus a grand total of 180,000 men.

Conversely, as far as the estimates relating to the cost of a structure that meets American standards are concerned, the method followed shall be the one suggested by others which proposes to refer to the cost of a UK soldier, whose operational capabilities compare favourably to those of an American soldier. Thus the additional cost to be sustained with respect to the current average cost of a European soldier can be determined [2].

According to the data supplied by the European Defence Agency (EDA), the cost per head of a UK soldier is equal to € 107,000, whereas the average European cost is equal to € 52,000. Therefore the additional yearly cost, vis-à-vis the current one, necessary to reach a standard similar to that of a UK soldier, is equal to about 10 billion euros, 0.10% of the European GDP [3].

These figures do not include investment outlays, i.e. the cost difference between the cost for a European soldier (in which the investment outlay is equal to 24% of the total cost per head) and that of an American soldier (in which the investment outlay is equal to 63% of the total cost per head). In the case of a British soldier, the annual per head investment (also including running costs and maintenance costs for equipment and infrastructures) is equal to € 153,000, whereas the average European cost is equal to € 31,000 (the American one is € 224,000 per head) [4].

Therefore the additional investments which the European countries involved in the implementation of a structured cooperation should meet, in order to equal the British standard, should reach at full operations 22 billion euros per annum, 0,23% of the GDP [5]. Altogether the differential annual expenditure vis-à-vis the one presently sustained by European countries who shall decide to go ahead with the implementation of the RRF, would be equal to 0,33% of the European GDP.

Financing the setting-up of a Rapid Reaction Force [6]

If a group of Countries decides to initiate a permanent structured cooperation, this very group, by definition must also be willing to bear the weight of the costs. What can be checked is whether the RT provides for European mechanisms of financing, thus contributing to maintaining, within a solid supranational institutional framework the start up of structured cooperation by a limited number of Countries. At a subsequent stage this cost could be included in the European budget.

The importance of this passage is emphasized by the fact that it would be the real channel through which the European Parliament shall be able to control the use of the RRF. Though the RT does not provide a direct reference to the financing of a RRF and of a structured cooperation, nonetheless it does appear to introduce innovations as far as the financing of operations in the foreign policy and security sectors are concerned.

If it is true that art. 28, relating to funding, refers to decisions made by a qualified majority, it refers to missions provided for by the following art. 28A which are decided unanimously. However, an interpretation of the articles makes one think that the funds the Union, or an avant-guard of EU Countries, make available, can be used to finance a structured cooperation.

To sum up: compared to what has been established in European Treaties up to now, art. 28 provides for two channels to finance foreign policy and security. The first channel gives direct access to the allocation of funds from the Union budget for missions provided for in two distinct articles, 28A, par. 1 and 28B [7]. The second channel gives access to an “initial fund” created by the contributions of member States. This “fund” was established by a qualified majority decision and also concerns missions provided for in the two articles quoted above [8].

Apparently there does not seem to be a direct connection, on the one hand, between permanent structured cooperation, the financing of which is left to the participating States; and, on the other hand, the resorting to European funds in the framework of the EU formed by 27 States.

One must however be aware of what the two articles state. First of all art. 28B, par. 2 claims: “The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation”. And then in the subsequent art. 28C: “Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 28 B, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task”.

Since in both cases, contrary to what was done in art. 28A par. 2, the fact that the Council decides unanimously has not been specified, one may think that the contents of art. 9C may be applied, according to which “The Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise”. On the other hand, the Protocol relating to the establishment of the permanent structured cooperation, refers to the missions contemplated in art. 28B, which does not specify that the decisions are made unanimously, and not to those contemplated in art. 28A, par. 1, which does specify that for their implementation the decisions are made unanimously.