The recent European elections have revealed two contrasting trends within the Union. In Western Europe, extremist forces have made significant gains, whereas in Eastern Europe, moderate forces have predominantly prevailed. This political polarization has been particularly evident in many of the founding countries of the European Union.
General thoughts
In Germany, there was a clear split between east and west; in France, both the extreme left and right made significant gains; in Italy, some divisive candidates received substantial support; and in Belgium, a deep division between Flanders and Wallonia was evident. The election campaign was marked by episodes of aggression and violence, albeit contained, while overall voter turnout slightly increased compared to previous elections.
National Results and European Implications
At the European level, the fragmented results of the 27 member states mitigated what the media had described as a “black wave”. Although some radical changes in party balances were observed at the national level, there was a moderate rightward shift of the political axis across the continent. The formation of parliamentary groups is a crucial step to understanding the effects of the vote on the future balance of the European Parliament and the majority needed for the election of the Commission President. While there is some stability in the EPP, S&D, Greens and Left groups, there may be reshuffling at the center, driven by Macron’s moves, and on the right, where Meloni is trying to attract parties from ECR, ID, and newly elected members.
One of the main questions concerns the maintenance of the so-called “cordon sanitaire” at the European level towards parties once considered “Eurosceptic” or “anti-system”. At the national political level, this barrier has collapsed in many countries, as evidenced by Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands. In this context, the EPP is in a privileged position to decide on the creation of a new “Ursula majority”, with Weber always keeping the door open to possible alliances to the right, even on an occasional basis.
The election results have also impacted the intergovernmental dimension of the EU. The governments of France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, four of the six founding countries, emerged much weaker from these elections. On the other hand, the governments of Italy, Spain, and Poland came out relatively stronger.
The elections, at least temporarily, marked the end of Franco-German leadership, which was already undergoing a deep crisis. Consequently, we may see the rise of “medium-weight” leaderships, such as Italy, Spain, and Poland, to advance specific initiatives on the EU policy level.
France, in particular, is experiencing a very complex phase: the dissolution of the National Assembly and the new alliance of the popular front have put pressure on French public debt, raising economic and political concerns. In Germany, an already weak and divided government has become even weaker. In Belgium, the government crisis has opened up possible scenarios of national disunity [1].
Future Prospects and Necessary Reforms
The European agenda has temporarily closed the historical window on Treaty reforms and a possible Convention, linking the opening of the institutional framework with the Conference on the Future of Europe to the new timeline dictated by enlargement.
Crisis after crisis, the axis of the communitarian debate has been shifting towards the policies, highlighting the existence of a genuine European power that needs to be oriented. In the post-pandemic era and amid the war in Ukraine, this shift has convinced even many former Eurosceptic forces to want to safeguard this power [2].
Initiatives to amend the Treaties at a time when progressives lack a clear strategy, direction, or defined political identity could even be counterproductive: they risk provoking antagonistic reactions, polarizing the confrontation on an ideological level they are unlikely to win, instead of fostering the integration of the once Eurosceptic forces into a system that no longer questions the existence of the community structure.
On the other hand, it should be noted that those who adhere to nationalist political thought (adapting it at all levels, from international relations to the ethical and identity levels) are much more capable to (and used to) breaking into the public debate through the narrative of what Anderson called “imagined communities”: self-consoling illusions that are extremely attractive to citizens, especially in a post-ideological context.
The public debate will soon focus on the Union’s budget and the need for autonomous fiscal capacity to tackle the “triple transition” (green, digital, and social) to ensure European public goods. By June 2025, the Commission must present the new multi-annual budget plan, so it is essential to avoid arriving unprepared. Another crucial deadline requiring urgent strategic action is the upcoming American elections. In the event of a Trump victory and a possible weakening of NATO, it is necessary for the public debate to have already clearly articulated the pressing need for a European foreign and defense policy.
It is essential to quickly consider what can be accomplished within the framework of the current Treaties, using this time before a future constitutional revival to advance integration on specific goals such as completing the single market, implementing the Green Deal, and establishing a European defense system (for the latter, an attempt can be made to “bypass” the blockade provided in the TUE). [3]
The gradual affirmation of European sovereignty alongside national sovereignties does not occur on its own; political forces must actively pursue this transformation, regardless of the immediacy of Treaty changes. Maintaining the constitutional proposal and the goal of overcoming unanimity in a federal direction as guiding principles remains crucial. However, this issue can only be effectively addressed with the support of the European Parliament in the context of the Union’s enlargement.
The Role of Federalists in a Complex Reality
In the current phase, politics can no longer be reduced to a Manichean opposition between Europeanists and anti-Europeanists; the scenario is complex, and we must adapt to be effective and avoid anonymity, instrumentalization, or collateralism. As federalists, to remain at the forefront politically, we must continue to work on two parallel paths that may seem contradictory but are both essential for breaking the deadlock. This approach follows the classic Weberian ethics of conviction (or principles) and responsibility (or ad consequentiam).
On the level of conviction, we need to undertake serious theoretical work, constructing a vision for the future that contrasts with the nationalist return to the past. This means engaging in a cultural battle not only for the federalist proposal itself but also for its ideal appeal as a unifying force in civilizational struggles, capable of providing a clear narrative and identity to progressive forces. Utilitarian Europeanism, which focuses stubbornly on the privileges of an “ATM Europe” is no longer effective. To connect with citizens and rebuild consensus, we must mobilize passions and identity, giving meaning to what it means to be European in a globalized world. We need to discuss this with intermediary bodies to help them overcome the crisis and with all new (and potentially more vital) social and political youth movements to try to translate their proposals into institutional action. Practically, the theme that could easily network these forces is the guarantee of European public goods, solidarity (territorial, generational, etc.), and the construction of a Europe capable of acting in economic and social contexts where national states are “dust without substance” when it comes to implementing effective solutions [4].
On the other hand, at the level of responsibility, it is crucial to distinguish a strategy based on interests that Spinelli characterized as “hard, tenacious, and achievable,” aiming to propose cross-cutting alliances that break the progressive/conservative front lines and foster unity of purpose. In this regard, clear initiatives on key issues are necessary to facilitate the gradual advancement of the unification process, leveraging its inherent contradictions. Similar to the euro and as previously envisioned by Albertini, we should not pursue a purely rational or linear path towards building the “European State,” but rather embrace all opportunities for progress to exploit these contradictions in a federalist context.
Examples at the strategic level, especially in light of the upcoming budget discussions, include industrial policy, competition, and energy issues, which we have extensively addressed in the European Movement Green Book [5]. However, even more pressing is the issue of defense policy, given the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict and the impending American elections.
In both scenarios, these proposals must include immediate actions and the establishment of horizontal networks designed to shape public discourse, engage citizens, and avoid merely symbolic gestures. To be effective and encourage participation from associations, movements, political entities, and institutions, these proposals must be straightforward, practical, and feasible. We need to move beyond debates centered on slogans and focus on shaping the future opinions that will guide public discourse. The federalist concept now exists independently of “historical federalism,” but it often risks misinterpretation. Therefore, it is crucial to navigate as a compass among progressives and pragmatically among all political forces in play.
Conclusions
The 2024 European Parliament elections underscored the significance of citizen engagement and the imperative to bolster the democratic legitimacy of European Union institutions. Understanding how to engage proactively in this process, taking a leading role and developing strategies ahead of upcoming deadlines, will be crucial to prevent being overtaken or misused.
The strength of federalists lies in their ability to tangibly translate a narrative of a plausible future, offering hope to people in a world in crisis. It falls upon us to determine how best to kindle that spark effectively.
This entails, on one hand, providing an alternative voice to the prevailing nationalism, and on the other, organizing the interests that facilitate tangible progress in European integration.
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