On the 19th March, 250 political prisoners were released by the Lukashenka regime - although 15 were instead forced into the EU’s member states as refugees. This comes as a new development in the ongoing negotiations between the Trump administration and Lukashenka’s representatives. So far, it has resulted in the release of almost 500 people, including some of the most high-profile prisoners like Viktar Babaryka, Maria Kalesnikava, and Nobel Prize winner Ales Bialiatski.
The negotiations began at a time when Lukashenka and Trump were actively looking for success stories on the international stage. For Trump, the release of political prisoners is another achievement to boast about on Truth Social, while shifting the focus away from his diplomatic failures in Ukraine, the Middle East, and elsewhere. For Lukashenka, this was a long-awaited opportunity to regain some of his international legitimacy, ultimately in a hope that sanctions would be relieved and he could be seen as a strategic partner.
From the very beginning, the narrative around the talks was stripped of any ethical evaluations or normativity. Trump and his representatives called hostage-taker Lukashenka “a strong and respected leader”, while Lukashenka did not even hide his view of the political prisoners as a valuable and replaceable stock that he could sell in bulk. Despite this, or perhaps because of this, the talks achieved the release of people who were unlawfully jailed for their democratic views.
The EU’s absence from the playing field
Yet, the EU has so far played no role in this process, despite it having a direct interest in both the regional security and the safety of pro-democracy activists. This is in spite of calls for action from both European actors and the Belarusian opposition. This lack of engagement undermines the traditional view of Europe as a bastion of democracy and human rights upholding in the region. Of course, it is a sign of a larger problem in the EU’s foreign affairs, especially when it comes to Russia and its sphere of influence.
The Belarus case highlights the main flaws of the EU’s foreign policy: it is slow, it is burdened by bureaucracy, it is poisoned by vetoes, and above all it is largely irrelevant, leaving the heavy lifting to member states, who on their own lack the required resources and leverage. The EU failed to do its “homework” before the 2020 elections, either in pressuring the authorities to ensure fair elections or in reinforcing civil society. Hence, the EU’s response to the subsequent political crisis was largely reactive.
Most of the crisis-related sanctions were introduced by the EU in 2021, supposedly as a result of divisions between member states, when the protest had already been largely squashed. After Lukashenka’s complicity in Russian aggression in 2022, the EU’s foreign affairs structures ended remaining attempts to structurally engage with Belarus and influence it in the long-term through channels like mobility, industry, and education. Now seen as a “lost cause”, Belarus was largely left to be dealt with by neighbouring member states.
The void that has given Trump influence
From structural engagement to isolation and securitisation, the EU decided on self-detachment from the issue and it is in this void that the Trump administration has found an opportunity to gain influence of its own. Six years into the political crisis in Belarus and four years into the war in Ukraine, we can see that the isolationist position has not yielded any feasible results. The regime stands, its economy is largely intact, while the level of repression remains consistently high.
Targeted at the regime, this approach has backfired on regular people, antagonising many previously pro-European Belarusians inside the country. The toxicity of the regime has also accelerated: border tension incidents are on the rise, contraband flows to Lithuania and Poland, while Belarus is preparing its infrastructure to receive nuclear weapons and long-range rockets from Russia. With the individual foreign offices in Warsaw and Vilnius unable to deal with the issue on their own, is there still a way for the EU to re-stabilise the region and re-establish itself as a powerful player?
The relaunching of the EU’s efforts in the region should start from the realisation that the complexity of the issue does not allow for engagement to be executed by individual member states - the only long-term solution can come from a synchronised EU policy. This long-term solution should once again be based on structural engagement, not securitised isolation. This time, however, such engagement should operate in a different frame - targeted not at the authorities, but at the people.
It’s not too late for Europe to reassert itself
Of course, while the war continues, the EU’s room for manoeuvre is quite limited, but this does not mean that the EU should refrain from attempting a re-engagement with Belarusians. Negotiations on the release of political prisoners could serve as a proving ground for this approach. As a positive signal to both the exiled opposition and regular Belarusians inside the country, EU engagement could yield tangible results that reinforce its internal and external image as the main human rights protector.
Furthermore, this could be achieved with no real loss of leverage, through largely symbolic means such as senior official visits or the re-establishment of embassies. Without strengthening Lukashenka’s regime in any practical manner, this would be a positive development for the civil society that remains in the country. If the initial results are positive, this people-focused structural approach could be expanded to counter the glueing of Belarusians to Russia. Europe could once again become a real alternative to the Ruski Mir (Russian World) project.
At the same time, the EU’s most potent levers, such as sanctions and border transit, should be “traded” only for the most substantial concessions from the regime. The long-term objectives of EU strategy must remain a full stop to political repression, the demilitarisation of Belarusian territory from the Russian military, and a “round table” scenario for a transition of power to the democratic opposition. The EU’s foreign policy should act upon one very simple truth: unlike Trump or Putin, only Europe is sincerely invested in a prosperous, democratic, and independent Belarus.
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