Identity as a banner
As with other European far-right parties, the AfD articulates its discourse around the defence of national identity, where immigration goes from being an economic or demographic phenomenon to an existential threat that erodes the very essence of what it means to be German. In its rhetoric, cultural diversity is framed as a euphemism for decadence.
A case in point is the party’s insistence on ‘remigration’, a sugar-coated term for what is essentially a policy of mass deportations, since in this case it includes not only those born abroad or without citizenship, but also non-white immigrants or those whose culture is considered a threat to the country. Björn Höcke, one of its most influential figures, embodies this exclusionary nationalism, promoting the idea that only a return to ‘traditional Germany’ could save the country from decline.
During Elon Musk’s participation in an AfD rally on 26 January, one of the tycoon’s most headline-grabbing statements was the rhetoric that Germans should stop being ashamed of their past. This is another key to the party’s success, offering those who feel abandoned by the state and overwhelmed by modernity a sense of pride they believed was lost, a national identity to cling to, even if this pride will not feed them, give them a job or a roof over their heads.
Against Brussels and traditional politics
National identity is not only constructed in opposition to the internal ‘other’, but also against supranational structures. Historically, few forces unite a political movement as effectively as opposition to a common enemy, which is why, since its founding in 2013, the AfD has made Euroscepticism one of its pillars, rejecting European integration and blaming the EU for the loss of German sovereignty. In its narrative, Brussels is depicted as a modern-day Leviathan subjugating the will of the people.
The migration crisis of 2015 also marked a turning point in German politics, which the AfD exploited to heighten cultural fears by positioning migrants and refugees as a threat to German cultural homogeneity and social cohesion.
The use of slogans such as ‘Merkel must go!’ (Merkel muss weg), in reference to Chancellor Angela Merkel and her open-door policy towards refugees, is a strong message that especially impacted the East German regions, where the population has less contact with immigrants, but higher levels of cultural anxiety. The chancellor accepted millions of migrants, but did not bother to integrate them.
The crisis of the grand coalition
The rejection of the CDU’s migration policy was one of the reasons for the SPD’s success in the last elections, but Olaf Scholz’s government has not only failed to deliver on the promise of change, but, far from promoting transformations that respond to the needs of ordinary citizens, the SPD’s measures have perpetuated a worn-out political model and have reinforced the belief among some that the Social Democratic Party and the grand coalition are at the root of Germany’s problems.
The SPD’s prolonged participation in the grand coalition has diluted its political identity, deepening the image of a party that is part of the establishment [3], disconnected from the problems of the average citizen and incapable of proposing any kind of reform, i.e. a party that offers no future for Germany.
This lack of differentiation between the two main German parties is what Matt Golder calls ‘party convergence’ and, far from being a phenomenon unique to Germany, it is a pattern that has allowed extremist parties to normalise themselves within the political sphere. As Beatriz Acha Ugarte reports in her study on the radicalisation of the far right in Western Europe, these political formations have managed to expand not only through their capacity to mobilise, but also through a process of normalisation and radicalisation, in which their discourses have been progressively legitimised in the public sphere. The AfD has taken advantage of this fact to fill this gap in the political spectrum, positioning itself as a real alternative to the ‘Große Koalition’, criticising the traditional parties and accusing them of ignoring the ‘ordinary citizen’ and positioning itself as the true voice of the people.
This is the perfect breeding ground for speeches as promising as they are simplistic to be echoed by those who feel forgotten by a system that promises progress, but reproduces the same old mistakes. Although Germany is one of Europe’s economic powers, there is a sector of the population that perceives itself as the ‘losers of globalisation’, especially those workers who have become more precarious or lost their jobs, who see the increase in immigration as a threat to their economic stability.
According to a report by the German Economic Institute, 38% of German companies plan to cut jobs by 2025, with industry being one of the most affected sectors, which especially impacts on low-skilled workers in eastern Germany, where the effects of reunification and the subsequent globalisation process were already creating a sense of abandonment. States such as Saxony and Brandenburg have seen lower wage growth compared to the west of the country, increasing the perception of inequality between Germany’s regions and providing the AfD with more fire with which to ignite its polarising discourse and position itself as the second force in the 2024 elections.
Security and the democracy trap
Apart from the economic and cultural factors mentioned above, the AfD has been able to capitalise on German society’s growing concern about security, especially events such as the attacks in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015, reinforcing the narrative of uncontrolled immigration and a system that, far from protecting the people, ignores them, thus serving as a significant electoral boost.
But the success of the extremist party cannot be explained by social factors alone; paradoxically, it is the democratic system itself that has benefited the AfD. The German political system, characterised by a proportional system that favours political representation, promotes the inclusion of small or recently created parties, which meant that the AfD only had to pass the 5% electoral threshold to obtain representation and, with it, a powerful media and political loudspeaker, as well as the legitimacy that comes with being part of the institutions.
This is another key point that is important to highlight, the media loudspeaker and the role that the media have played in the success of the German party, as the AfD has received extensive media coverage, both positive and negative. This supports Matt Golder’s theory that far-right parties can gain visibility and legitimacy even through negative media coverage, which is especially observable in Germany, where the immigration and security debate dominates the media landscape with cases such as the aforementioned Cologne attack.
The real question
The question we must therefore ask is not why the AfD has grown so much in such a short time, but what democracy has done to allow it to do so. Why today’s society, despite all the supposed social and technological advances, feels so abandoned, isolated and alienated that it resorts to ideologies that have caused so much harm in the past. It is not enough to point to the far right as the problem; we must accept that its rise is a symptom of something deeper, the failure of a system that has so far ignored those it was meant to protect and represent. If democratic institutions are not capable of offering an alternative to citizens, if they do not combat the sense of helplessness and identity vacuum that fuels these movements, then, sooner or later, democracy will be left with nothing to defend.
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