An era has come to an end. America and Russia, each in their own way, are propelling us into a new era: the era of continental unity. Should we passively allow events to unfold? If not, then the question is: What do we want Europe to look like?

Hendrik Brugmans (1952)

For several years, especially since the second Trump Administration, the world has been experiencing an authoritarian wave. Democracies appear increasingly fragile. Even the most successful democracy in recent history, the US, shows signs of drifting toward excessive nationalism and executive centralisation. What does this mean for Europe, the continent that regards itself as the cradle of democracy, invoking a legacy stretching from ancient Greece to the French Revolution?

More than 70 years ago, Hendrik Brugmans, first President of the Union of European Federalists, argued that the emerging world of continental powers required a federal Europe. For him and many others shaped by the experience of life under both fascism and Communism, federalism was not an abstract ideal, but an antidote to the authoritarian state.

This conviction was shared by leading figures of the European resistance during the Second World War and found programmatic expression in the Ventotene Manifesto, drafted by Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colorni in 1941. Their central insight was structural: lasting peace and democracy in Europe required overcoming models of sovereignty based in the nation-state.

Federalism as the alternative to authoritarianism

Federalism is no miracle cure. Federal states such as Germany or Switzerland are not free of internal tensions. Yet, the early federalists identified a decisive advantage: democracy becomes more resilient precisely when power is divided not only horizontally, between legislature, executive and judiciary, but also vertically, between different territorial levels.

The US developed into a durable democracy in large part because of this vertical separation of powers. Authority is distributed between Washington and the states, preventing the concentration of political power in one location. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Donald Trump, who seeks to expand executive authority, has not only confronted Congress and the courts, but also clashed with individual states and governors.

The Trump administrations have represented a turn toward centralised presidential power, despite the Republican Party’s traditional scepticism to federal overreach. Historically, the link between centralism and nationalism is well established. Germany, with its long federal tradition, was fully centralised only once: between 1933 and 1945, under Nazi authoritarian rule. “Trump was right about everything” is now the only internal truth, “America first” the external reality.

Europe’s structural problems are an absence of federalism

What, then, is the situation within the EU today? Authoritarian and anti-European forces have gained ground across several member states. Ironically, these forces frequently accuse “Brussels” of centralisation while advocating strong executive power at home and absolute sovereignty abroad. In reality, the member states retain substantial influence over EU legislation, particularly through the European Council.

Yet, the intergovernmental structure is precisely where a key weakness lies. Decisions are still shaped primarily by national perspectives and short-term domestic interests. Ernesto Rossi had already warned in his post-Ventotene writings that a Europe governed predominantly by national representatives would reproduce national rivalries, rather than overcoming them. His Europe was one by Europeans, for Europeans, rather than a balancing act of the Italian, German, and French states.

If Europe wants to assert itself in a world defined by regional powers—namely the US, Russia, and China—it must move beyond this intergovernmental structure. A federal Europe would require a European Commission formed by a majority group in the directly-elected European Parliament. Meanwhile, a second chamber of states would replace the European Council, taking an advisory role over its current vetoes and blocking of truly European initiatives.

Europe needs clear, democratic accountability in place of opaque negotiations among national executives. Such ideas have circulated for decades. Even establishment figures like Mario Draghi have recently called for deeper integration. But the public debate remains limited, and reform proposals from the Conference on the Future of Europe were largely sidelined by member states in 2023.

Federalism is the only way to survive the 21st century

Federalism curbs nationalist fragmentation. Nationalist movements often combine anti-democratic rhetoric with emotionally-charged, but structurally weak, policy proposals. In a highly globalised 21st century, purely national solutions rarely match the scale of today’s challenges. But federalism also prevents the emergence of an overly centralised Europe. Paul-Henri Spaak famously remarked “there are only two kinds of states in Europe: small states, and small states that have not yet realised they are small.”

Properly designed federal systems preserve regional autonomy and cultural diversity while pooling sovereignty where necessary. Nationalism tends toward uniformity and concentration of power; federalism institutionalises plurality. The debate becomes particularly urgent in the field of defence. Europe faces growing security threats and can no longer rely unconditionally on American guarantees. Yet, instead of integration, we observe 27 separate rearmament processes.

A genuinely integrated European defence structure remains difficult within the EU’s current institutional framework. European integration after 1945 sought not only peace, but also the constructive embedding of then-German power. Today, as Berlin speaks of building the strongest conventional army in Europe, the question of integration re-emerges. Fragmented rearmament in a politically unstable environment could become dangerous if nationalist forces gain further influence.

Europe must federalise, now

National sovereignty within Europe has long been limited in practice. The choice increasingly lies between an illusion of national defence and security or real protection under a federal European state. In Brugman’s 1952 text, he predicted this choice. “We will have to decide: federal democracy or fictitious state sovereignty.” This is becoming clearer to us than ever before with the limited ability of the disorganised European states to protect its interests in Ukraine and Greenland.

The great paradox of our time is that a federal European state lacks the support required to form it, even though it is precisely what is needed to solve the vast majority of the issues and threats that are driving people into the arms of authoritarian parties and their charismatic leaders. Yet, while the empty promises of nationalists gain momentum, the constructive ideas for European unity continue to go unheard.

This must change and our voices as federalists must become louder. The need for structural reform and a Europe by the people and for the people must be put on the agenda and again with the same force of Cato as he warned against Ancient Rome in the times of ancient Rome. It is in the spirit of Cato that I declare as I write this today: “Europe must be federalised!”