Ask people what the EU is and you will get vastly differing answers: certain are normative, along the lines of “the EU is the only entity that has achieved prosperity at such a large scale”, and others are more functional: “the EU is an organisation of ever-increasing delegation between multiple levels”.
Respectively, some citizens prefer to keep their answers more general, e.g., “the EU is more than just an international organisation”, while others are reductionist: “the EU is not just a project of economic integration, but it does not represent a full political union”.
Recognising this discord, Europe has branded itself as a sui generis - or unique - entity. In other words, it has agreed to park the question and defer it to a later date. By doing so, it has acknowledged that it is only partially sovereign. To be sovereign means to be understood as such by citizens, other entities, and, most importantly, by yourself.
An entity that cannot answer its existential question of what it is in a clear, articulate manner remains ontologically incomplete. For such purposes, being “‘more than just an international organisation”, or any of the other answers, simply does not cut it.
The Importance of Speaking Clearly
This is precisely the argument that European federalists have been making for decades. Now, the former President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, while speaking to the Katholike Universiteit Leuven, has finally vocalised a crucial truth: the EU is a confederation, nothing more, and nothing less. If it is to remain relevant, it must make the final step of its evolution.
Calling the EU precisely what it is in a concise and understandable way achieves three things: it creates a bridge between the US’s federal structure and what Europe could have, it outlines that federalism is ultimately an “opt-in” structure, and it reframes federalism from a critique to a mainstream political theory.
Being sui generis implicitly means accepting that, although we can use history as a canvas, our circumstances are ultimately unique. Calling ourselves a confederation, however, allows us to point at the US as an example of how, in due time and with a lot of commitment, vision, and courage, internal divisions notwithstanding, a federal structure was born. By borrowing from this historical legacy, we can show the blueprint exists.
Furthermore, naming the confederation as such allows one to sidestep the false dilemma between uniformity and fragmentation. The truth of international cooperation is that once an institution is created, it fundamentally alters the incentives for participation - not just for those inside, but also for those that initially chose to abstain. At the core of the question of federalising lies the existential question of survival.
There Is No Better Time Than Now
This is ultimately the bitter reality of a continent that only has two types of states: those that are small, and those that have not yet realised they are small. But unlike populist movements, this mechanism of opt-in means that federalism is not a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum, but a dynamic, inclusive system that will always accept those who are willing to fight for it.
The old international order is now defunct. The post-Cold War security architecture, premised on American military protection and multilateral trade rules, has evaporated. The US, under its current posture, explicitly sees European political fragmentation as serving its interests. The idea that Russia only threatens Eastern Europe is naïve, for it threatens all regions of Europe alike. China continues a growth model that includes offloading costs and controlling supply chains, at the geopolitical expense of a sovereign Europe.
The confederal structure has exhausted its utility. For decades, the loose coordination of member states was just enough for integration to progress at the pace that it did. The single market produced prosperity, NATO provided security, the dollar’s hegemony created a stable international environment.
Unfortunately, each of these pillars has either disintegrated or is barely hanging on by a thread. The EU cannot negotiate effectively with the US or China as a confederation. It cannot coordinate military responses to hybrid threats, defend critical infrastructure, or invest at continental scale in frontier technologies.
Call It by Its Name (and the Rest Will Follow)
For decades, leaders have paid rhetorical homage to federalism, while systematically avoiding any discussion of substance. In all EU integration handbooks, federalism is reserved to a handful of pages, usually in the form of an interesting but detached criticism, an artifact of a peculiar minority. The talks of an “ever closer union" might be romantic, but they also mask the EU’s institutional paralysis.
If we accept the EU is currently a confederation, then federalism is not an extreme leap, but the natural evolution of an existing structure that has reached its functional limits. After all, moving from confederation to federation linguistically involves removing the “con-” prefix. The question then shifts from “should we dramatically reimagine Europe?” to "what conditions prevent our confederation from becoming a federation?”
This reframes the federalist, who has for a long time been seen as a critical theorist or, worse, a utopian within the European project, into a pragmatist, a problem-solver, and a boots-on-the-ground policymaker. Ask around Europe, and I can guarantee these are the same traits European citizens want to see in European leadership.
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