At the recent German parliamentary elections, the far-right AfD finished in second place. In Austria, the far-right came first. Romania only narrowly avoided electing a pro-Putin candidate as president. All over Europe, right-wing populists are making gains, as are left-wing populists in some areas. Germany’s Left party had a strong result too, for example.
Some leap on these results as justification for more interventionist policies. The state must grow, they say, in order to stem the populist tide. This analysis is backwards. If Europe wants a post-populist future, we must create space for a new, stronger middle class, not suppress wealth creation by expanding the size of the state. Populism means we need less intervention, not more.
There are many possible explanations floating around for what makes these populist parties strong and how to combat them. German-born American University professor Isabella Weber wants to “abandon market fundamentalism” and “design an economy that serves the needs of the general population.” The tools? “Fairer” taxation along with more public investment and an active industrial policy.
As Weber and others point out, there seems to be a correlation between austerity and a rise in right-wing populism. This is especially visible in economically vulnerable regions, where people who feel the government cannot protect them from the negative side-effects of markets appear more likely to turn out for right-wing populists.
However, those calling for more state intervention have got the wrong end of the stick. The question to ask is not how the government can help those who were left behind – it’s why they need this help in the first place. In other words, the state might be part of the disease, not the cure.
Discussing this may be important for the survival of democracy. In the 1950s, sociologist and political scientist Seymour Martin Lipsed argued economic development facilitates democracy because it leads to the emergence of a middle class. Among other factors, a strong middle class can take a more distant stance towards politics. Who governs does not affect their economic situation and thus, they can vote for liberal principles instead of, for instance, income redistribution.
Danger arises when a majority feels its economic situation depends strongly on election outcomes. In Europe, politicians increasingly appear to be saviours rather than public servants. If more and more people feel the basics of their lives hinge on an election outcome, they will become more invested than they should. If political power is what matters for private success, fights to be on top become more bitter.
Research on the topic supports this view. Especially in Latin America, precarious economic conditions make people more supportive of abolishing constitutional guardrails for presidents. People feel their private economic fortunes are dependent on who is in power. If their candidate is in power, they want them to have free reign. Choosing this path, citizens lose both economic stability and political liberty.
The correct approach to battle the populist wave is not more government involvement in our private lives. If we transfer more power to governments, such as by increasing taxes or introducing sweeping new regulations, the battle to become top dog will only become more vicious. Those who feel left out will be more, not less, willing to support illiberal parties – because they feel their economic success depends on who’s in power.
To avoid the Latin American situation, Europe needs less, not more, dependence on government. Lipset’s insight remains true: a strong democracy needs an independent middle class. It needs people who are involved in politics but do not perceive it as a struggle for survival.
Governments will not foster such a class through higher taxes, more redistribution, or more involvement in the decisions of private business. Instead, they should try to ease the burden on the middle class. Lower taxes on income, a more supply-oriented housing policy, and less bureaucracy for businesses – which stifles small and medium-sized enterprises in particular. This does not mean that we should not ignore those who feel left behind by politics or by recent economic transformations. A wealthy democracy has the tools to take care of those who need it. But we cannot address the root of the problem by making these people, and everyone else, feel even more that their fate is in the hands of politicians. The state can assist, with restraint, but it cannot take control of their economic destinies.
For a democracy which is less susceptible to populist influences, we need people who believe their success lies in their own hands. It is people like that who can disagree with the outcome of elections but maintain their commitment to liberal democracy. Without a strong middle class, Europe’s democracies may not survive.
Follow the comments:
|
