This present article is part of a series of articles published as part of the “Europe - What if?” Campaign by JEF Europe, within the project CompletEU framework. Its aim is to acknowledge that Europe is not limited to the European Union. Therefore, we invite our readers to examine the complex relationship the EU has with non-EU and newly EU countries in Europe and how this relationship could develop in the future.
In 2024, Freedom House recorded the 18th consecutive year of global democratic decline. Today, 72% of the world’s population lives under authoritarian rule - the highest proportion since the 1990s.
Montenegro, a Western Balkans country of just 630,000 nestled on the Adriatic, might seem an unlikely battleground. Yet this tiny nation, once hailed as a poster child for Euro-Atlantic integration, now exemplifies how quickly democratic institutions can erode when authoritarianism wraps itself in tradition, faith, and national identity.
From Kleptocracy to Theocracy: The 2020 Turning Point
The transformation began in winter 2019, following a change of the ruling party in summer 2020, after tens of thousands of Montenegrins took to the streets in “litije” (religious processions). Protesting the 2019 Law on Freedom of Religion-which required religious organizations to prove property ownership predating 1918-these demonstrations represented something far more significant: the mobilization of religious nationalism as a tool of political change.
These protests were documented by multiple sources, including the US State Department and Freedom House, which noted how “the SOC organized massive nationwide protests and prayer marches against a religion law” and how “thousands marched against the Law on Freedom of Religion”. These protests were expressed as public liturgies and processions in major Montenegrin cities and towns, with support from both the Serbian government and the government of Republika Srpska.
In August 2020, Đukanović’s Democratic Party of Socialists lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since independence. The victorious coalition included figures like Andrija Mandić, who had been sentenced to five years in prison in 2019 for his role in an alleged 2016 coup attempt (though he was later acquitted in a 2024 retrial). International observers initially celebrated this as democratic progress, but what emerged was not liberal democracy-it was competitive authoritarianism.
The Authoritarian Playbook in Action Montenegro’s new leadership has followed a familiar global script:
Weaponizing Education: The government has pushed for expanded religious instruction in public schools, with debates over mandatory “vjeronauka” classes echoing similar moves in other Orthodox-majority countries where traditional values are being institutionalized through education policy.
Media Environment: The most egregious example involves the national broadcaster RTCG, where Boris Raonic has been repeatedly appointed as General Director despite court rulings that his elections were unlawful. The European Commission’s 2024 report explicitly identified Raonic’s repeated illegal appointments as an obstacle to Montenegro’s EU path, yet he remains in position-demonstrating how legal violations can be normalized through repetition.
Institutional Capture: Key appointments to judicial and administrative positions increasingly favor candidates with stronger ties to religious and nationalist movements, raising concerns about the politicization of previously technocratic roles.
Constitutional Manipulation: Most strikingly, in 2025 the government pushed through agreements with the United Arab Emirates for development of the 12-kilometer Velika Plaza beach in Ulcinj. The agreement’s Article 2.4 stipulates that contracts with UAE investors are exempt from Montenegro’s public procurement, tender, and competition laws. Though President Jakov Milatovic returned the proposed law to parliament for reconsideration, it must be reconsidered by parliament, showing how economic deals can bypass constitutional oversight.
The Global Pattern: Religious Nationalism as Political Weapon
Montenegro’s trajectory reflects broader patterns identified by scholars of democratic backsliding. Modern authoritarianism rarely announces itself with tanks and coups. Instead, it advances through legal mechanisms, cultural manipulation, and gradual erosion of democratic norms.
The fusion of religious identity with political authority represents a global phenomenon. In India, Modi’s BJP systematically marginalizes Muslims while promoting Hindu nationalism. In Brazil, Bolsonaro cultivated evangelical support while attacking secular institutions. In Hungary, Orbán speaks of “illiberal democracy” while elevating Christianity as national foundation.
Montenegro’s Serbian Orthodox Church plays a similar role, providing moral legitimacy for illiberal policies while portraying secular governance as foreign imposition. This dynamic transcends traditional political divisions, appealing to voters across socioeconomic lines who feel alienated by rapid change and economic uncertainty.
The Youth Factor: A Generation Lost to Liberalism
Perhaps most alarmingly, Montenegro’s authoritarian turn enjoys significant youth support. The 2018/19 Friedrich Ebert Foundation survey revealed that 62% of Montenegrins aged 14-29 believe “the state should be governed by a strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with parliament and elections”-higher than their parents’ generation.
This contradicts assumptions about youth as inherently liberal. Growing up with formal democracy doesn’t guarantee democratic values. Montenegrin youth experienced democracy primarily as dysfunction: corruption scandals, economic stagnation, and political elites seemingly detached from ordinary concerns.
Social media amplifies these trends. Young Montenegrins increasingly consume content from Serbian and Russian sources portraying Western liberalism as decadent and threatening to traditional values. The government has done little to counter this drift, leaving media literacy programs underfunded while civic education focuses on procedures rather than values.
EU Complicity: The Accession Dilemma
The European Union faces a fundamental challenge in Montenegro. Brussels views the country primarily through a geopolitical lens-its 2017 NATO membership was celebrated as victory against Russian influence. EU leaders worry that blocking accession might push Montenegro toward Moscow, a concern amplified by Serbia’s pro-Russian stance under Aleksandar Vučić.
This geopolitical logic may prove counterproductive. By prioritizing stability over democratic quality, the EU risks importing another illiberal member state. Hungary and Poland’s post-accession backsliding already demonstrated that EU membership doesn’t prevent democratic erosion-Montenegro might join as a formally democratic but substantially authoritarian country.
EU progress reports consistently understate democratic concerns. The 2023 report praised “peaceful political transitions” while minimizing media restrictions and judicial independence issues. This reflects a broader EU weakness: monitoring mechanisms excel at detecting formal violations but struggle with subtler democratic erosion.
The Opposition’s Structural Weakness
Montenegro’s democratic opposition faces challenges mirroring problems across the region. Opposition parties remain personalized around individual leaders rather than programmatic differences. Support for liberal democracy concentrates in urban areas while rural regions embrace religious nationalism, making coalition-building difficult.
Most critically, educated young Montenegrins increasingly emigrate to Western Europe, weakening the domestic constituency for liberal democracy. The 2023 census revealed a 2.5% population decline since 2011, concentrated among university graduates.
Democracy’s Fragile Future
Montenegro matters not for its size but for what it reveals about democracy’s 21st-century fragility. A country that seemed to successfully transition from socialism to liberal democracy has quietly slid toward competitive authoritarianism-all while maintaining democratic forms.
This transformation occurred through patient accumulation of small changes: media pressure here, judicial appointments there, curriculum modifications elsewhere. By the time international observers recognized the pattern, much damage was done.
The global implications are sobering. If democracy can erode so quickly in a small EU-candidate country with strong international oversight, how secure are democratic institutions elsewhere? Montenegro’s experience suggests formal democracy is easier to establish than democratic culture-and the latter can disappear while the former remains intact.
The window for reversing Montenegro’s authoritarian drift is closing. Success requires acknowledging an uncomfortable truth: democracy’s survival depends not just on elections and institutions, but on citizens who value pluralism and rule of law above tribal loyalties and strongman promises.
Montenegro’s story is still being written. Whether it ends with successful democratic restoration or serves as another cautionary tale will depend on choices made in Podgorica, Brussels, and Washington. For democracy’s global future, those choices had better be right ones.
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