In December, the European Council finally resolved the months-long deadlock over funding for Ukraine. The decision to abandon the reparations loan model in favor of joint borrowing, raising €90 billion through common debt, was not a sign of weakness. On the contrary, from a federalist perspective, it marked a meaningful precedent: another step towards Eurobonds and another step towards fiscal union.
Yet, this outcome was overshadowed by the conduct and rhetoric of an unexpected figure: Belgium’s Prime Minister, Bart De Wever. While his opposition to the Commission’s plan earned applause at home and criticism abroad, both camps largely missed the core issue. The biggest development was not Belgium’s demand for risk-sharing, but the openly anti-European reasoning De Wever deployed. This was a reasoning that undermines trust among member states - particularly those living under the shadow of Russian aggression.
Step One: Spread Misinformation About Your Legal Standing
Belgium’s prominence in the debate is easily explained. Around €193 billion of the €210 billion in frozen Russian assets are held by Euroclear, a Brussels-based financial infrastructure firm. Had the EU opted for a reparations loan backed by these assets, Belgium would have borne a disproportionate share of the legal risk if Russia challenged the move. But media coverage often exaggerated this danger, suggesting that Russia could easily reclaim the funds and leave Belgium footing the bill.
In reality, as analysis from the Centre for European Reform has shown, Russia’s chances of success in international arbitration are slim, which could be reduced further through targeted legislative changes at both a national and a European level. Even so, it is not unreasonable for Belgium to demand full mutualisation of risk. Any member state would do the same. This, however, is not where De Wever stopped.
Step Two: Repeat Russian-American Talking Points
The real cause for concern lies in De Wever’s own words, notably in an interview with La Libre days before the summit:
“. . . but who really believes that Russia will lose in Ukraine? It’s a fable, a complete illusion. It’s not even desirable for them to lose and for instability to take hold in a country that possesses nuclear weapons. And who believes that [President] Putin will calmly accept the confiscation of Russian assets? Moscow has let us know that in the event of a seizure, Belgium and I personally will feel the effects "for eternity”. . . Russia could also confiscate certain Western assets: Euroclear has €16 billion in Russia. All Belgian factories in Russia could also be seized.”
De Wever’s first deeply troubling claim was that Russia will not lose the war, dismissing such an outcome as an “illusion.” This is not realism; it is defeatism dressed up as prudence. Europe is not a neutral observer of the war in Ukraine. Russia is its adversary, Ukraine its partner.
If one believes Russia may not lose, the logical response is to strengthen European action - not to normalize a Russian victory as an acceptable scenario. For Belgium, such an outcome may appear distant and manageable. For Poland, the Baltic states, or Finland, it is existential. De Wever’s reasoning exposes a narrow national lens: a willingness to accept outcomes catastrophic for others because they are survivable at home.
Even more alarming was De Wever’s assertion that Europe should not even desire a Russian defeat, citing fears of instability in a nuclear-armed state. This argument closely mirrors long-standing Russian and American talking points: that nuclear powers must be accommodated to prevent escalation. Translated into policy, this logic implies that states living next to a nuclear aggressor must simply endure intimidation for the comfort of those farther away. It accepts a world in which “might is right” and nuclear weapons grant de facto impunity. For Europeans living next to Russia, this is not an abstract debate, but a question of survival.
Step Three: Hide Behind Your Own Inaction
De Wever also expressed concern about potential Russian retaliation against Belgian private interests still operating in Russia, including assets held by Euroclear and Belgian companies with factories in the country. This raises an unavoidable question: why are such companies still there at all? Treating the protection of lingering commercial interests as a strategic priority signals that Russia is not viewed as an enemy, but as a risky business partner. Companies that chose to remain active in a sanctioned aggressor state knowingly accepted that risk.
Finally, De Wever cited explicit threats from Putin - directed both at Belgium and at him personally - as justification for caution. But if European leaders require absolute safety before acting, collective security becomes meaningless. What message does this send to leaders in Kyiv, Riga, or Tallinn, who live under constant threat - not in a hypothetical sense - but every single day? If intimidation is rewarded with restraint, then Europe signals that coercion works.
Step Four: Proclaim Yourself As the “Rational” One
The troubling reasoning coming from De Wever persisted after the Council met:
“. . . if there are big interests at stake, it can clash, and a normal politician when he takes a decision, he lets go of all the emotions that were attached to it. . . they want to punish Putin by taking his money. And I understand, and certainly countries close to Russia, who live in animosity with Russia found this emotionally satisfying, the idea of taking Putin’s money. But politics is not about emotion, it’s a rational job.”
This posture is deeply corrosive. It casts frontline states as irrational actors who must be lectured by those who think “rationally”, delegitimises their security concerns, and reframes survival as sentimentality. Such rhetoric strikes at the heart of the European project.
A union cannot function if those most exposed to aggression are told their fears are exaggerated, their instincts unsophisticated, and their interests secondary. How are Latvia and Estonia meant to trust that their fellow Europeans will come to their defense if they become the next target of Putin, instead of advocating restraint and “rationality”? Skepticism towards European defense commitments did not arise in a vacuum and statements like these only reinforce it.
There is justified lamentation at the attachment of some Eastern European nations to the “American protector” fantasy, even now as the US is ruled by the far-right and openly admit that their values align with Russia and not Europe’s liberal democracies. But trust cannot be demanded, it must be earned. And it is squandered every time “rationality” becomes a euphemism for disengagement.
Step Five: Hide Behind the 24/7 News Cycle
Europe will never manage to move forward towards a federation and face the emerging global challenges as long as the “not my problem” mindset persists in various nations who feel that some European challenges do not affect them. Euroscepticism is easy to denounce when it comes wrapped in the symbols of the neo-Nazi Alternative for Germany, the rebranded, Pétainist National Front, or the modern-day Falangist Vox. It is far more insidious when it appears in polished language, voiced by a mainstream leader and framed as sober statesmanship.
Coming from De Wever, this language is far more unchallenged, as reality proves: how many articles and analyses have deconstructed and criticized his statements and train of thought? Almost none. They went unnoticed, overshadowed by De Wever’s silver-tongued retorts, the live coverage of the Council’s last-minute change of course, and the rest of the news cycle which was dominated by a frequent visitor to Jeffrey Epstein’s island.
Europe cannot move towards a federation while the “not my problem” mindset persists among those who feel insulated from shared threats. Federalism is not merely about institutions or debt instruments; it is about recognizing that Europe’s security, values, and fate are indivisible. It is therefore the responsibility of federalists – and of all who believe in a Europe capable of defending itself from Narva to Nicosia and from Tbilisi to Nuuk - to call out this mindset when it appears, especially in high office. Silence allows it to harden into norm. De Wever did not simply argue for caution. He offered a glimpse of a Europe that calculates rather than commits, accommodates rather than confronts. That vision deserves not deference, but firm rejection.
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