Since oil became the dominant energy resource, the energy link between Europe and Asia was largely driven by commercial convenience and regional stability. Today, it has become a matter of strategic survival for non-oil-producing countries, particularly in Europe. As the smoke rises over the Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz remains a chokepoint following the War in Iran, a new geopolitical reality is forming.

From the Berlaymont in Brussels to the cabinet rooms of New Delhi and Tokyo, the realisation is the same: the age of fossil fuel dependence is not just an ecological suicide pact, but a strategic vulnerability. Europe first learned this lesson in February 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The invasion served as an awakening, forcing the EU to confront its reliance on oil and gas from Russian pipelines.

In response, Brussels conjured up the concept of “derisking”. Unlike the American concept of “decoupling”, which implies a total break, derisking is a strategy of reducing critical dependencies on systemic rivals through supply chain diversification and domestic production, focussing especially on the energy chain supply. However, this strategy of derisking has had an unintended side effect.

When the EU pulled away from Russian oil and gas by imposing sanctions, it created a vacuum that countries like India and other Indo-Pacific states were more than happy to fill. Throughout 2024 and 2025, India significantly increased its imports of Russian crude, effectively acting as a refinery that laundered Russian oil for the world market, believing that cheap, diverted Russian energy could shield it from global shocks.

From derisking to a green exit

The War in Iran shattered India’s illusion that cheap Russian energy would shield it from the world. When the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed in March 2026, roughly 20% of the world’s oil and gas supply vanished overnight. In addition to the “Yemeni risk” with the Houthis’ semi-control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which once was a nuisance, it became a total blockade of the two major energy trade corridors of the world.

The impact across the EU has been damaging—across Asia it has been catastrophic. In India, people faced the worst gas shortage in the state’s history, with the government forced to release emergency reserves as West Asia supply lines snapped. Prime Minister Modi has been navigating a political minefield as petrol prices hit record highs, calling for a “patriotic great restraint [on petrol use activities]”.

In Japan, with 93% of its oil dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, Tokyo was forced to release 80 million barrels from its national stockpile, equivalent to 45 days of demand, in order to prevent an industrial collapse. The same has occurred in South Korea, which is facing a “triple shock” of record inflation, a 17-year low for the South Korean won, and 26 ships stranded in the Gulf.

These disruptions have exposed the vulnerability of the semiconductor and petrochemical industries, both of which play strategic roles in global supply chains. Both Indonesia and the Philippines declared national energy emergencies by May 2026, imposing governmental control on activities utilising oil and a four-day week in the public sector to restrain petrol consumption. This shared trauma has created a shared interest in going beyond derisking—and towards a permanent “green exit”.

The architecture of a new approach

While governments are responding to the immediate crisis, a quieter revolution has been unfolding in the legal architecture of international trade. The EU’s recent free trade agreements (FTAs) have evolved from simple tariff reduction instruments into sophisticated mechanisms for enhancing energy security. For instance, last year’s EU-Australia FTA included a specific chapter that prohibits export duties on critical minerals like lithium and nickel.

Similarly, the EU-India FTA is what Prime Minister Modi and European Commission President von der Leyen called the “Mother of all Deals”. It does not just slash tariffs; it establishes a Joint Hydrogen Council, integrating research on smart grids, sustainable urbanisation, and sources of energy like solar panels. The EU is no longer looking east just for markets. It is searching for allies in an emerging post-carbon world.

But this Eurasian convergence faces a "dragon” in the room: China. For years, Europe lived under the illusion that it could lead the green transition while outsourcing the manufacturing to Beijing. The coronavirus pandemic was the first crack in this facade, revealing that a green transition dependent on a single supplier is just as dangerous as a dependency on Russian gas.

China has aggressively positioned itself as the unavoidable partner. Beijing already controls over 80% of the global solar supply chain and it is rapidly expanding its market share in Europe and Asia by undercutting local manufacturers. This is not just trade, but a bid for energy and industrial hegemony. In response, the EU has taken the unprecedented step of blocking funding for specific Chinese solar technologies to protect the digital security of the European power grid.

A Eurasian alternative to China and Russia

India has doubled down on its production-linked incentive schemes to build a domestic solar industry that can compete with the Chinese behemoth, with the help of shared technology with the EU in the Mother of all Deals. Yet, the increasing demand for clean energy, especially since the beginning of the oil crisis, has boosted Chinese exports of wind turbines and solar panels, creating an even larger trade imbalance between China and the rest of the world.

This has created a delicate solar paradox. Europe and Asia need Chinese technology to decarbonise quickly enough to slow down global warming and weather the storm of the oil crisis caused by the War in Iran. But, at the same time, they need to build walls to prevent Beijing from becoming the new hegemon. It has become clear that oil is no longer an asset—it is a liability that can be weaponised at any moment.

While fossil fuels still dominate the energy mix in 2026, the political will has shifted irrevocably. The interests of the European Union and the democracies of Asia have never been more aligned. We are witnessing the birth of a new kind of global logic that spans continents, now based on a shared need for energy strategic autonomy. A green alternative to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is being paved, and it could create a path for a Eurasian alternative to China and Russia.