The practice of democracy is not passed down through the gene pool. It must be taught and learned anew by each generation of citizens.

Sandra Day O’Connor

For decades, successive American administrations have pursued policies aimed at weakening or transforming the Islamic Republic of Iran, often under the banner of promoting a free and fair democracy. Yet, the results have consistently fallen short of those ambitions. The most recent cycle of confrontation between Washington and Tehran, culminating in military escalation, severe economic pressure, and growing regional instability, has once again demonstrated the limits of its foreign policy.

Rather than advancing democratic development, these policies have imposed significant economic hardship and human costs on Iranian society, while further destabilising the conditions necessary for democratic change. Under the Trump Administration, democracy promotion has evolved into one of its most militarised, coercive, and ultimately superficial forms. In doing so, the Trump Administration has failed to strengthen democratic forces inside Iran.

Worse, still, the Trump Administration has undermined the principles that have formed part of the democratic tradition, both in Iran and the US. Although most modern Republican administrations have incorporated democracy promotion into their foreign policy, there has been a gradual shift in approach from post-war American conservatism, to neoconservatism, and lastly to America-first conservatism that has corroded the democratic institutions it pledged to defend.

From American conservatism to America-first conservatism

Post-war American conservatives such as Russell Kirk argued that the US should primarily promote democracy through example rather than intervention. In his view, America’s greatest influence came not from military power but from demonstrating the success of its institutions, civil society, and political culture. Under this framework, if democracy is attractive then other nations will seek to emulate it.

Neoconservatism departed from this tradition by placing a greater emphasis on military power and intervention as tools for reshaping external political systems. America-first conservatism inherited the coercive instruments that were developed by neoconservatives under the Bush Administration, without a clear democratic vision of its own. The result is a foreign policy speaking the language of democracy but prioritising pressure and confrontation, regardless of the consequences.

History repeatedly demonstrates that democratic systems depend upon strong civil societies, educated populations, functioning institutions, social trust, and a political culture capable of sustaining pluralism. These are precisely the foundations that military confrontation and economic collapse tend to erode. The true strength of democratic states has never rested solely on hard power. It rests just as much on their soft power to attract, persuade, and inspire.

The lack of an approach to promote democracy in Iran

Throughout his first term, President Trump’s statements often suggested a limited understanding of the distinction between the Iranian state and Iranian society. Unlike President Obama, who sought to create incentives for moderation within the political system through diplomacy and targeted pressure, Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign imposed some of the broadest sanctions in modern history.

The underlying assumption was that economic pain would become so severe, ordinary Iranians would either overthrow the regime or force it into changing direction. Yet, this strategy overlooked a fundamental reality of political change. Populations experiencing severe economic insecurity often become less, not more, capable of sustained civic engagement. When survival becomes one’s primary concern, democratic mobilisation becomes increasingly difficult.

During his second term, President Trump’s approach became even more contradictory. Initially, he attempted to normalise relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran without addressing the deeper historical and strategic roots of hostility between the two countries. After those efforts failed, policy shifted once again toward pressure and confrontation. Economic sanctions intensified, military operations expanded, and regime change re-entered the public discourse.

At various points, figures as ideologically different as Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran’s last monarch, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the populist former President of Iran, were mentioned as potential transitional figures. Such discussions revealed a striking inconsistency. If democracy was truly the objective, why was so little attention devoted to the actually existing pro-democracy movements? Evidently, democracy itself was not the primary goal. Winning the confrontation with Iran was.

Iran has become a more fragile and radical society

One of the most significant effects of President Trump’s approach has been the weakening of the social foundations necessary for democratic development. The “maximum pressure” campaign produced neither regime change nor democratic reforms. Instead, it accelerated economic deterioration, shrank the middle class, and encouraged the emigration of many educated and politically engaged Iranians.

As reformist and moderate voices lost influence, more radical alternatives gained visibility. Monarchism, once a relatively marginal current within the opposition, attracted greater support, while protest movements increasingly adopted more confrontational rhetoric and tactics. A comparison between the Green Movement of 2009 and more recent waves of unrest suggests a broader shift toward political polarisation and radicalisation.

President Trump’s rhetoric and actions strengthened one of the Islamic Republic’s most enduring narratives: that foreign powers seek not merely political change but the weakening or even dismemberment of Iran. His statements regarding the arming of protesters through Kurdish groups, coupled with threats of military action and discussions of regime change, reinforced this perception. Concerns about national sovereignty and territorial integrity became more immediate than reform.

The consequence of President Trump’s approach has been to inadvertently strengthen the Islamic Republic’s claim to be the defender of Iran, while weakening the credibility of prominent dissidents who initially supported the US intervention. He has ultimately reinforced the Islamic Republic’s position while undermining many of the social and political forces necessary for a transition to democracy.

Is there still hope for Iranian democracy?

In this situation, Europe faces both an opportunity and a responsibility. Rather than following the American model of coercive democracy promotion and adding more ineffective and counter-productive sanctions, the EU and its member states and partners should invest more heavily in providing education, academic exchange, cultural engagement, civil society partnerships, and people-to-people connections.

Democratic values are not transmitted through sanctions, missiles, or military operations. They are learned through institutions and discussions between people from different backgrounds.. Universities, research collaborations, cultural initiatives, and professional networks can all play a role in strengthening democratic norms among individuals without attempting to impose political outcomes.

The goal should not be to engineer political change inside Iran. It should be to expand opportunities for Iranians to engage with democratic institutions. Sustainable democratic development emerges when citizens internalise democratic values and possess the organisational tools necessary to pursue change peacefully. The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya illustrate a fundamental lesson: the long-term political fate of a nation ultimately depends on its own society.

Democracy requires time. Instead of strengthening democracy, policies that weaken the middle class and radicalise political discourse undermine these prerequisites. Trump’s approach toward Iran often had precisely this effect. Instead of creating conditions favourable to democratic development, it has significantly pushed back the push for Iranian democracy. But there is still hope. Democracy cannot be imposed upon a nation—but it can be built by its people.